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Abstract
This paper considers the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on firm strategies and, 
in particular, the configuration of firms’ global value chains (GVCs) once the pan-
demic has been brought under control. The merits of alternative location strategies 
(international diversification vs reshoring) are compared, as are the merits of different 
governance arrangements (internalization vs externalization) for GVC activities. The 
possibility of fire-sale foreign direct investment is raised, and the wider geopolitical 
context is emphasized. The widespread human tragedy is noted, as is the dilemma 
facing national governments around the world in balancing lives and livelihoods.




There will come a time when the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic will be (to a greater or 
lesser extent) under control.1 Many people will have died in the meantime, many 
others will have lost friends and/or family members, and many businesses will have 
ceased to exist. But for those of us fortunate to survive, lockdowns, social distanc-
ing and other such measures will be memories, and our lives will return to a degree 
of normality. The timescale is still very uncertain at the time of writing (mid-April 
2020), but the objective of this paper is to consider the medium-term impacts on 
 * Roger Strange 
 R.N.Strange@sussex.ac.uk
1 Centre for International Business and Development, University of Sussex Business School, 
Brighton, UK
1 The UN Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) note that the term epidemic refers to an 
increase, often sudden, in the number of cases of a disease above what is normally expected in that popu-
lation in that area, whilst pandemic refers to an epidemic that has spread over several countries or conti-
nents, usually affecting a large number of people. The distinction is important, both in terms of control-
ling the disease and in mitigating its economic impact.
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firm strategies and, in particular, the configuration of firms’ global value chains 
(GVCs) once all pandemic-related restrictions have been removed.
The Covid-19 pandemic has three essential features. First, it is a global phenom-
enon in that the virus has been detected in most countries around the world. About 
half of humanity (c4.5bn people) was under some form of containment in the ini-
tial stages of the pandemic.2 This feature differentiates the Covid-19 pandemic from 
other recent virus outbreaks3 whose health effects have been more limited and local-
ized. As the Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (2020: 3) comment, the 
‘last time the world responded to a global emerging disease epidemic of the scale of 
the current Covid-19 pandemic with no access to vaccines was the 1918–19 H1N1 
influenza pandemic.’ Second, the effects of the pandemic have been multi-dimen-
sional in that it has had adverse impacts both upon public health and upon eco-
nomic activity in most national economies. Furthermore, policy responses designed 
to address one adverse impact typically exacerbate the other: lockdowns slow the 
spread of the virus but harm the economy, whilst allowing people back to work ben-
efits the economy but may lead to more infections. This differentiates the pandemic 
from financial crises where potential remedies were easier to conceive and match 
to the underlying problems. Third, the pandemic is contagious not just in the health 
sense but also in an economic sense, as the global economy is so inter-connected 
through GVCs and international movements of people, capital, goods and services. 
Trade in intermediate goods and services account for over 60% of total international 
trade Contractor (2020) reports that multinational enterprises (MNEs) were involved 
either as exporters or as importers, or as lead firms in GVCs, in 80 percent of all 
world trade (amounting to around $US 20 trillion in 2019). He further reports that 
the same MNE was both the exporter and the importer (i.e. simultaneously on both 
ends of the shipment) in approximately 40 percent of world trade. The corollary is 
that no country is immune to the health and economic impacts of the virus unless it 
is totally isolated from the rest of the world.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we briefly consider 
the public health impact of the pandemic, and highlight the difficult dilemma that 
governments worldwide face in trying to balance the health and economic effects 
on their countries in the short-term. Our intention is not to address this dilemma, 
both because we do not have the necessary data to make informed judgments and 
because, ultimately, the choices will be political decisions. We then outline the 
short-term supply and demand shocks that the pandemic has inflicted on national 
economies. We next summarize the benefits for firms from participation in GVCs 
in normal times, and the problems that ensue when people and goods cannot move 
freely during pandemics. Next, we address how firms might adjust their strategies 
2 BBC website, 18 April 2020.
3 More recent virus outbreaks such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 
2002–2004, the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) epidemic in 2012, the Ebola epidemic in 
2014–2016, and the Zika epidemic in 2015–2016 are all termed epidemics because their geographic 
reach was not global. Furthermore, the numbers of fatalities during these epidemics—though still high—
are much lower than the fatalities already linked to the Covid-19 pandemic.
1 3
Journal of Industrial and Business Economics 
once the Covid-19 pandemic has been brought under control, particularly with 
regard to the configuration of the GVCs in terms of the locations of the different 
activities and their governance. We conclude by emphasizing the geopolitical con-
text within which the pandemic is proceeding, and the obvious (but maybe over-
looked) point that the virus needs to be brought under control everywhere not just in 
individual countries.
2  The public health impact of the Covid‑19 virus
The basic facts about the Covid-19 virus are that it is highly contagious through 
social contact, that those infected may show few (or even no) symptoms or may be 
badly (even fatally) affected, and that those infected may or may not develop immu-
nity. The symptoms appear to be more severe for older people with pre-existing con-
ditions, though many young and healthy people have also been affected. Extensive 
efforts are being made around the world to develop a vaccine. But it is likely that 
there will be a significant delay (months? years?) involved in designing, testing, 
mass producing, and administering such a vaccine.
The public health impact of the virus means that governments around the world 
are caught between the proverbial “rock and a hard place”: they are trying to balance 
lives and livelihoods. On the one hand, they are quite rightly concerned to minimize 
the number of infections (and the adverse health effects), to slow down the spread 
of the virus so that their health systems are able to cope, and to reduce the num-
bers of re-infections. Absent the successful deployment of an effective vaccine, this 
has involved teams of epidemiologists forecasting the spread of the virus. But these 
forecasts are inevitably sensitive to the modus operandi of the virus, the underlying 
assumptions regarding the social behaviour of populations, and the counter-meas-
ures introduced by governments. Different countries responded to the onset of the 
pandemic in different ways, at different rates, and implemented counter-measures 
(quarantines, lockdown, self-isolation, social distancing, closure of non-essential 
businesses, mass testing (both for infection and for antibodies), contact tracing, 
required use of facemasks and other protective equipment, travel restrictions) of 
varying severity. Most countries introduced draconian restrictions on travel across 
their national borders,4 and many also implemented internal restrictions. Some gov-
ernments reacted quickly and implemented counter-measures whilst the number of 
confirmed cases were relatively small; other governments were slower.
4 See the Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker. Available at:
 https ://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/resea rch/resea rch-proje cts/coron aviru s-gover nment -respo nse-track er
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3  The effects on national economies
Perhaps the most obvious short-term effect of the counter-measures will be the sup-
ply-side impact on productive activities as employees are restricted from accessing 
and/or travelling to their workplaces (Wren-Lewis 2010). Some people will be able 
to work remotely from home, but this will not be possible in many sectors. People in 
the retail and hospitality sectors (restaurants, cafes, bars, hotels etc.) will be particu-
larly hit, as will those employed in a variety of service industries (e.g. public trans-
portation, hairdressing and beauty salons, cultural and sports events, leisure cen-
tres) where close personal contact is required. Furthermore, some people will also 
become infected by the virus, and will be unable to work for extended periods of 
time.5 Others may be unwilling to work for fear of becoming infected by the virus. 
Furthermore, school closures will mean that many parents will be unable to work as 
effectively either in their workplaces or even from home (Wren-Lewis 2010). There 
will also be indirect effects on suppliers of intermediate goods and services, as buy-
ers cancel orders and/or extend their payment periods. These indirect effects will be 
larger when the buyers are large firms who can exploit the power asymmetries in 
their GVCs. These supply shocks are thus likely to fall disproportionately on small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and their employees, and on self-employed 
people: these groups typically have limited cash reserves, and may be unable to 
weather the pandemic financially. In contrast, some sectors (e.g. e-commerce firms, 
delivery firms) will thrive.
On the demand side, consumption and purchasing patterns will change. These 
demand shocks will complement and reinforce the supply-side shocks. Firms and 
individuals will adjust their demand for a whole range of products. Demand for 
many products will fall (e.g. non-essential consumer goods, oil) even when there 
are no supply restrictions. Much consumer expenditure is “social” in that it involves 
close contact with other people (e.g. visits to restaurants and bars, attendance at 
sports events, concerts and theatre performances) and will be negatively affected by 
the pandemic (Wren-Lewis 2010). Demand for other products (e.g. streaming ser-
vices) will rise. Home food consumption will increase as a result of home-working 
and lockdown measures, and may be exacerbated by stockpiling. Consumer shop-
ping in town centres and retail parks will fall, but online shopping and delivery will 
increase. These changes in consumer behaviour will require adaptations to distribu-
tion networks, and these adaptations may take time to come into effect resulting in 
localized shortages.
Now governments can (and many have done) try and mitigate these shocks 
through combinations of macroeconomic stimulus packages (e.g. lower interest rates 
and fiscal stimuli), and direct support for businesses, employees and self-employed 
people. Perhaps inevitably, these efforts will not cover everyone and will not cover 
the full financial impact of the shocks. It is likely that many SMEs will go out of 
5 Including the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, who self-isolated between 25 March and 5 April 
2020, was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit at St Thomas’ Hospital on 5 April, discharged from hospi-
tal on 12 April, and only returned to normal working on 27 April.
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business unless they are provided with short-term bridging finance. Disposable 
income, and hence expenditure, will be lower. Share prices have already fallen, 
reflecting concerns about current business prospects and future uncertainties (Wag-
ner 2020), and this too will depress consumer expenditure.
In due course, governments will try to relax their counter-measures and their 
economies will recover, at least in part. There will sadly be many people who will 
not survive the pandemic, and also businesses which will cease to trade. But schools 
will reopen, travel will be permitted, and most people will go back to their original 
working arrangements. Furthermore, consumption—and, in particular, social con-
sumption—will resume. But many governments will have incurred substantial debts, 
and these will need to be funded by long-term borrowing, increased taxation and/or 
reduced public spending.
4  The advantages and disadvantages of GVC participation
As noted above, the contemporary global economy in highly inter-connected 
through GVCs.6 At the aggregate level, this inter-connectedness is reflected in flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and the high (60%+) proportion of global trade 
accounted by cross-border trade in intermediate goods and services. From a micro 
firm-level perspective, GVCs are characterized by various linked activities under-
taken by firms in different countries. Some GVCs are characterized by numerous 
small firms each carrying out specific activities that are coordinated through arm’s 
length transactions. Other GVCs may involve many activities being internalized 
within large MNEs, although even highly-integrated firms will still need to buy in 
some inputs and may also rely on independent distributors.
There are many good reasons why firms choose to participate in GVCs in normal 
times. First, it is often the case (particularly in more advanced economies) that inputs 
of intermediate goods and services from abroad may be cheaper than similar inputs 
sourced from the domestic economy. These cost advantages may be due to lower 
labour etc. costs in foreign locations, but may also reflect differences in climate (e.g. 
in food production) and natural resources. Second, there may not be enough produc-
tive capacity in the domestic economy to provide the necessary inputs in sufficient 
quantity, or inputs of the requisite quality. Third, diversified global sourcing not only 
reduces firms’ unsystematic risks, but also provides them with greater resilience to 
supply chain disruptions. Firms which are exclusively reliant on inputs from their 
domestic economies are vulnerable to local disruptions such as local epidemics, 
strikes, hurricanes, floods, terrorist threats etc. Last but not least, consumers value 
the greater choice offered by the availability of final goods from foreign sources. 
On the debit side, GVCs bring additional costs (compared to domestic value chains) 
in terms of higher transportation costs, extended delivery times, and greater com-
plexity—and these additional transaction costs will tend to rise with the different 
6 Buckley and Strange (2015) highlight how and why the international division of labour has progressed 
over the last 30 years.
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dimensions of distance (Ghemawat 2001). But the proliferation of GVCs suggests 
that the potential benefits of GVCs normally outweigh the costs. This conclusion, 
however, rests upon the relatively free movement of goods and services,7 and of 
people and capital worldwide. Some services may be delivered electronically (e.g. 
banking services), but most tangible goods need to be physically delivered from one 
location to another.8 This physical distribution—whether by road, rail, air and/or 
sea—involves people, and at least some of these people will need to cross national 
boundaries. Many GVCs also involve overseas subsidiaries of domestic multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs), and these MNEs will require the international movement 
of staff and other employees as part of the regular management of their operations. 
Furthermore, several industrial sectors (e.g. food production) involve the substantial 
employment of seasonal migrant labour.
The Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the weaknesses in this model of doing busi-
ness. First, expatriate staff and/or many of the people involved in the physical dis-
tribution of goods (truck drivers, seafarers, pilots etc.) may be directly affected by 
the virus, or may not be allowed to cross national borders. This will impede the 
effective operation of the GVCs. Second, international air travel has been severely 
circumscribed, even though most ports and sea routes remain open. Third, social 
distancing and other health checks create delays at borders. These disruptive effects 
become ever more severe, and the additional transaction costs larger, the greater the 
distances involved and the more borders that need to be crossed. These disruptive 
effects have highlighted sectors in which economies lack domestic productive capac-
ity. Fourth, many firms (and governments) have experienced shortages of key goods 
and services, as foreign suppliers have favoured local customers. This discrimina-
tion has been particularly apparent in the supply of pharmaceuticals and medical 
equipment such as ventilators and personal protective equipment. Last but not least, 
the pandemic has exacerbated the long-standing scepticism of many people to free 
trade. Such sceptics include workers in many advanced economies who have seen 
their jobs offshored to the emerging economies in the recent past, as well as politi-
cians and other people who abhor the pooling of sovereignty implied by the elimi-
nation of trade and investment barriers. Here it is illustrative to note the numerous 
comments by the US President (Donald Trump) about decoupling the US and Chi-
nese economies and bringing manufacturing activities back to the United States, by 
the Australian PM9 (Scott Morrison) about nurturing local manufacture to ensure it 
is less reliant on global value chains, and by the Japanese PM10 (Shinzo Abe) about 
9 See Jamie Smyth, ‘Coronavirus shortages prompt Australia to bring manufacturing home.’ Financial 
Times, 15 April 2020. Available at: https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/04ac7 83d-8ced-4e66-9437-78b60 7cbd8 
d4.
10 See Walter Sim, ‘Coronavirus: Japan PM Shinzo Abe calls on firms to cut supply chain reliance on 
China.’ Straits Times, 16 April 2020. Available at: https ://www.strai tstim es.com/asia/east-asia/coron 
aviru s-japan -pm-shinz o-abe-calls -on-firms -to-cut-suppl y-chain -relia nce-on-china .
7 Trade in many goods and services may be subject to tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, but firms 
will factor in such additional costs when establishing their GVCs.
8 Typical value chains involve the provision of many different goods and services in many different loca-
tions, and hence involve multiple deliveries across many national boundaries.
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building an economy that is less dependent on China so that the nation can better 
avoid supply chain disruptions.
5  The effects of the pandemic on firms’ GVC strategies
The Covid-19 pandemic will eventually be brought under control. People will go 
back to work. Consumption, and especially social consumption, will recover. Those 
firms that survive will restart production. Travel, both domestic and international, 
will resume. There will be numerous post-pandemic inquests seeking to establish 
the precise origins and epidemiological behaviour of the virus, and critically exam-
ining the responses of governments and supranational organizations (especially 
the World Health Organization) around the world in terms of containing the health 
effects of the virus and in mitigating the economic impacts of the counter-measures. 
It will become apparent that many governments were caught out by the speed and 
virulence with which Covid-19 took hold in their countries, and/or were also guilty 
of a lack of preparedness for such an eventuality. There will also be calls for gov-
ernments to introduce better early warning mechanisms in their public health agen-
cies, to restore indigenous manufacturing capabilities of essential products (e.g. vac-
cines and other pharmaceuticals), and to stockpile critical medical equipment and 
supplies.
But how should firms adjust their strategies, particularly with regard to the con-
figuration of the GVCs in terms of the locations of the different activities and their 
governance—i.e. which activities are internalized (integrated) within the firm, and 
which are externalized? There will no doubt be much debate (both within firms 
and more widely) about how firms should build greater resilience through, on the 
one hand, reshoring GVC activities that had previously been offshored and, on the 
other hand, internalizing activities that had hitherto been undertaken by independent 
suppliers.
Reshoring may be achieved either by MNEs repatriating activities undertaken 
by foreign affiliates, or simply by firms replacing overseas suppliers of inputs with 
domestic suppliers. Reshoring should shorten supply chains, and make them less 
vulnerable to restrictions on the cross-border movement of people—though the sup-
ply chains will still be affected by any domestic restrictions on travel. Greater inter-
nalization of key activities might also bring potential benefits inter alia in terms of 
assured supply; improved scheduling and coordination; the elimination of opportun-
istic recontracting; and increased bargaining power vis-à-vis buyers and suppliers 
(Strange and Magnani 2018).
But would such significant reconfigurations of GVCs be merited? First, it is 
important to reiterate the cost and risk reduction benefits that firms derive from 
international diversification of their sources of supply. Reshoring may be a good 
idea if it allows firms to be closer and more responsive to the needs of their cus-
tomers, but it heightens the exposure of firms to supply disruptions in their domes-
tic economies. Furthermore, reshored activities may still require raw materials and 
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other inputs that can only be sourced from overseas—hence reshoring may simply 
move reliance on imports further upstream in the GVC.11
The greater internalization of value-chain activities also has potential benefits, but 
these must be set against the additional costs. Greater externalization allows firms 
inter alia to focus on their core competences, and hence economize on their scarce 
financial and managerial resources; to have greater flexibility in response to volatile 
output demand; and to access cheaper and/or better quality inputs due to competi-
tion between outside suppliers (Strange and Magnani 2018). Certainly, firms should 
reevaluate the location and governance of their GVCs, but they need to weigh up 
the conflicting imperatives of robustness and efficiency. Firms might also consider 
alternative methods (e.g. establishing spare domestic capacity, stockpiling, greater 
liquidity, better risk management) of mitigating adverse effects on the functioning of 
their GVCs. But spare capacity, stockpiling and maintaining additional liquidity all 
involve opportunity costs.
Second, the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has largely arisen from 
a combination of the supply shock and the demand shocks discussed above, and the 
severity of these shocks has varied by country according to the rates of infection 
and the counter-measures adopted by governments. Certainly, there have been seri-
ous supply chain shortages in some countries/sectors (notably, as noted above, in 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment), but the impact such shortages needs to be 
evaluated alongside the impacts of the supply and demand shocks. It would make lit-
tle sense to reconfigure GVCs if supply chain shortages were not the critical factor.
Third, the focus on supply chains draws attention away from the fact that many 
firms rely on foreign sales as well as domestic sales, and that diversification in rev-
enue streams is also a means of reducing unsystematic risk. Reshoring of GVC 
activities may increase resilience in terms of domestic purchases, but it will con-
comitantly increase the costs of making foreign sales. FDI may be undertaken for 
efficiency-seeking reasons, but it may also be motivated by market-seeking, natural 
resource-seeking or strategic asset-seeking (Dunning and Lundan 2008). Further-
more, many firms try to manage their foreign exchange exposure by balancing their 
revenues and costs in different currencies, and reshoring selected activities might 
upset this balance.
Fourth, the Covid-19 pandemic is, as noted above, a global phenomenon, and 
both the health and the economic impacts have been experienced by most countries 
in the world. It would be feasible for firms to configure their GVCs in anticipation of 
epidemics that were likely to be localized (by diversifying into multiple countries) 
or diseases (e.g. malaria) that are endemic to certain countries (by either avoiding 
those countries, or taking appropriate preventative action). But the global spread of 
11 For instance, there are only a few countries in the world that are significant producers of the rare 
earths (e.g. neodymium, dysprosium, lanthanum, gadolinium, cerium) that are essential elements in 
many electronic products. Currently 85% of world production is in China, and 10% in Australia. The 
rare earths are essential because of their special electrochemical, magnetic and/or luminescent properties 
(Kirkpatrick 2019).
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the Covid-19 virus took most people by surprise12 and, as noted above, different 
national governments reacted in different ways. Most firms will hopefully consider 
future pandemics as part of their routine risk assessment activities henceforth, but it 
is not certain that reshoring and internalization are the appropriate responses given 
that future pandemics are as likely to impact domestic economies as foreign loca-
tions. Rather, more international diversification and greater externalization are prob-
ably the answer. It has also been apparent from the Covid-19 pandemic that some 
countries (e.g. South Korea) were both more ready and responded more quickly and 
appropriately, than others. Firms might well be advised to consider such country-
specific readiness and responsiveness as relevant location-specific advantages when 
making future location decisions.13
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the eventual reconfiguration of firms’ GVCs 
will to a large extent be determined by the responses of their national govern-
ments, and notably their attitudes towards conducting business with and in China. 
It is already apparent (see above) that the US, Australian and Japanese governments 
are looking explicitly to decouple their economies from their (inter)dependence on 
China, and this will no doubt be buttressed by a narrative looking to blame China for 
the onset of the pandemic. Furthermore, the Covid-19 pandemic has come at a time 
when globalization was already under threat because of concerns in many countries 
about sovereignty, national security and the unequal distribution of the benefits from 
globalization (Kobrin 2017; Aguilera et al. 2018; Rodrik 2018; Strange 2020).
6  Final remarks
The Covid-19 pandemic has been global and indiscriminate. It has had a public 
health impact (if not equally) upon people in all countries (even indirectly in coun-
tries which have not reported confirmed cases) of all ethnicities, of all genders, and 
of every status in society, and given rise to restrictions on their freedom of move-
ment. The pandemic has also had economic impacts as all countries have suffered 
supply and demand shocks to their national economies, and disruption to their 
international trade and investment flows. Furthermore, these adverse impacts—and 
national policies to mitigate their effects—have been felt beyond national borders.
Many firms, both large and small, have struggled to survive during the pandemic, 
and this will inevitably focus attention both on the apparent failings of their past 
business models and on how to build greater resilience in the future. The main con-
clusions from this paper are twofold. First, the widespread reshoring and/or inter-
nalization of GVC activities are unlikely to lead to greater resilience but may well 
12 Not everyone was taken by surprise, and nor should they have been. Many commentators have long 
recognized the potential dangers of pandemics: see, for example, Bloom et al (2018), Fan et al (2018), 
Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (2019) and the March 2015 TED talk by Bill Gates. See the sum-
mary of the talk at the World Economic Forum website: https ://www.wefor um.org/agend a/2020/03/bill-
gates -epide mic-pande mic-prepa redne ss-ebola -covid -19/.
13 This will be particularly the case if the international role and funding of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) are eroded as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
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necessitate substantial switching costs. Second, resilience will come from more, 
rather than less, diversification involving more suppliers in more countries, thus 
guarding against individual governments which close their borders to international 
movements of people, capital, goods and services. But—and this is the crucial con-
sideration—the evolving geopolitical context and rising protectionist sentiments 
worldwide are likely to be the critical drivers.
There will also be new business opportunities. Many otherwise viable businesses 
will fail because of cash-flow problems, and these may well be acquisition targets 
for cash-rich firms and other investors. Krugman (2000) coined the term “fire-sale 
FDI” to refer to the flows of inward FDI into South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and 
other affected economies after the Asian Financial crisis of 1997–98. There are 
already reports that Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are mobilizing to buy 
shares in firms whose valuations have been hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic.14 
These possibilities have not escaped the attention of policy-makers. For instance, 
the European Commission warned Member States in March 202015 to strengthen 
their vetting of foreign takeover bids, stressing that the Covid-19 pandemic had left 
“strategic assets” within the bloc vulnerable to acquisition from overseas. In India, 
the government tightened its foreign investment rules in April 2020 to block “oppor-
tunistic takeovers” of indigenous firms, especially by Chinese buyers.16
It would not be appropriate to end this paper without emphasizing once again 
the widespread human tragedy as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. There are real 
dangers that many countries will adopt parochial and nationalist responses to the 
pandemic, and that poorer countries may suffer particularly with regard to food sup-
ply (World Food Programme 2020). But the Covid-19 pandemic is a global phe-
nomenon, and its health impact cannot be confined to national borders. It will need 
concerted global cooperation to bring it under control. It is also to be hoped that 
national governments and relevant supranational organizations learn lessons from 
the Covid-19 pandemic, and take appropriate steps to reduce the likelihood of future 
pandemics, to improve the policy responses, and to minimize the adverse economic 
impacts.
14 Including Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala and the Qatar Investment 
Authority. See Andrew England & Simeon Kerr, ‘Cash-rich Gulf funds hunt for bargains as asset prices 
plunge.’ (FT, April 16 2020). Available at: https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/3facc 407-200f-4e7c-9914-79b4b 
aece1 19?email Id=5e9dc 563af a44b0 0049a b389&segme ntId=f5ff1 a1a-1590-1863-3861-e9c91 a6a3b 7f.
15 See the press release ‘Coronavirus: Commission issues guidelines to protect critical European assets 
and technology in current crisis’ from the European Commission, 25 March 2020. On 29 April 2020, the 
French economy minister announced an extended list of sectors deemed to be “strategic”, and reduced 
to a 10% stake the threshold for exercising a veto on non-European investors. Other EU countries imple-
mented similar measures.
16 See Benjamin Parker, ‘India moves to curb Chinese corporate takeovers.’ Financial Times, 18 
April 2020. Available at: https ://www.ft.com/conte nt/ad3f8 4b0-fb75-4588-97e8-4a657 ad678 83?email 
Id=5e9ed 01df3 399c0 004da a49a&segme ntId=2785c 52b-1c00-edaa-29be-7452c f90b5 a2.
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